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Abstract 
Let S = Tif=1 Si be the strategy space for a finite n-person game. Let {s10, • • •  , Sno) E S 
be any strategy n-tuple, and let Ti= Si-{si0}, i = 1, ... , n. We show that the maximum 
number of regular totally mixed Nash equilibria to a game with strategy sets Si is the
number of partitions 'P = {P1, • • •  , Pn} of UiTi such that, for each i, #P; = #Ti and
Pin Ti = 0. The bound is tight, as we give a method for constructing a game with the
maximum number of equilibria. 
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1 Introduction
The Maximal Number of Regular 
Totally Mixed Nash Equilibria 
by 
Richard D. McKelvey and Andrew McLennan 
Harsanyi's (1973) theorem states tha�, for generic (that is, outside an exceptional set
whose closure has Lesbesgue measure zero) payoffs of a normal form, there are finitely many 
Nash equilibria, all of them 'regular.' Roughly, an equilibrium is regular if the strategies 
assigned no probability have strictly suboptimal expected payoffs, and the derivative of 
those equilibrium conditions that are satisfied with equality is nonsingular. Harsanyi's 
methods do not suffice to show that there is a maximal number of regular equilibria, 
but this is a consequence of Bezout 's theorem. For any regular equilibrium, the implicit 
function theorem implies that nearby payoffs have nearby regular equilibria, so the maximal 
number of regular equilibria is attained on an open subset of the set of payoffs. 
A Nash equilibrium is totally mixed if every pure strategy is assigned positive probability. 
Any Nash equilibrium gives rise to a totally mixed equilibrium of the smaller game obtained 
by eliminating all unused pure strategies, so the maximal number of regular totally mixed 
Nash equilibria is a lower bound for the maximal number of regular Nash equilibria. 
Let S = I17=1 Si be the strategy space for a finite n-person game. Let (s10, ... , Bno) E S
be any strategy in n-tuple, and let Ti = Si - { sw}, i = 1, ... , n. We show that the 
maximum number of regular totally mixed Nash equilibria to a game with strategy sets Si 
is the number of partitions P = { P1, .. . , Pn} of UiTi such that #Pi = #Ti and Pi n Ti = 0
for all i. 
This result has implications for the complexity of the var.ious computational problems 
arising out of the concepts of noncooperative game theory, most obviously for the problem 
of enumerating all equilibria. In §5 we provide closed form upper and lower bounds on 
the number of partitions described in the preceding paragraph. Roughly, the lower bound 
implies that the maximal number of regular totally mixed Nash equilibria grows rapidly 
with the number of agents and the numbers of pure strategies they can choose from. 
For example, fixing the number of pure strategies for each agent, the maximal number is 
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exponential in the number of agents, while if we fix the number of agents, the maximal 
number is exponential in the minimum number of pure strategies for any one player. Here 
we illustrate these results in the following table giving the maximal number for normal 
forms in which each of n agents has k pure strategies to choose from.
k 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
3 2 10 56 346 2252 15184 104960 739162 
4 
5 
n 6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
9 297 13833· 748521 4.4Xl07 2.8X109 l.8Xl010 
44 13756 6.7X106 4.0X109 2.7X1012 1.9X1015 1.5X1018 
265 925705 5.7X109 4.5X1013 4.1X1017 4.2Xl021 
1854 8.5X107 7.8Xl012 9.6X1017 
14833 1.0X1010 1.6X1016 
133496 l.6X1012 
1.3X106 
Table 1.1 
Maximum generic number of totally mixed Nash equilibria 
for an n-person game, where each player has k pure strategies
1.2X1013 
1.2X1021 
Another immediate consequence of our characterization is that if Si is the largest strat­
egy set, then a necessary and sufficient condition for there to exist payoffs for which there 
is a totally mixed regular Nash equilibrium is that (#Si - 1) ::; Eu,i(#Sj - 1). 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In §2 we show how to transform the 
usual expression of the conditions of totally mixed Nash equilibrium into a form that is well 
suited for our analysis. The transformed system developed in §2 eliminates one variable for 
each player and eliminates the requirements that probabilities add to one and are positive. 
We show that the transformed system has the same maximal number of regular solutions 
as the original system. The transformed algebraic system consists only of equations, and 
makes sense as a system of equations in several complex variables with complex coefficients. 
This allows us in §3 to apply a remarkable theorem of Bernstein (1975) (who built on the
work of Kushnirenko (1975)) to obtain a combinatoric characterization of the number of 
complex regular solutions of the transformed system for payoffs that are generic in the 
space of complex payoffs. Since each regular equilibrium can be extended locally (in the
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space of complex payoffs) to a branch of the equilibrium correspondence, this number is 
automatically an upper bound on the maximal number of regular totally mixed equilibria 
for real payoffs. 
In §4 we construct a real payoff for the game in which all equilibria are regular, and 
there are as many (real) equilibria as are allowed by Bernstein's theorem. Thus it follows 
that this is the maximum possible number of regular totally mixed equlibria, and there is 
an open set of real payoffs on which this number is attained. 
In §5 we provide a recursive combinatoric characterization of the number derived from 
the application of Bernstein's theorem to our problem, and this characterization is used to 
develop closed form upper and lower bounds. In §6 we illustrate our results by analysing 
in detail the simplest non-trivial example, the three person game where each player has 
two strategies. 
2 A Sequence of Related Problems
We consider a finite player, finite strategy normal form game determined by a set of 
players I= {1, ... , n }, and finite nonempty disjoint sets of pure strategies Si, ... , Sn. For 
each i let d i= #Si - 1, and let Si= {sw, ... 'SidJ· Defines= niE/ Si.
For each i E J, let Ei be the set of all functions O"i : Si -+IR. Let :E = I1ieI Ei, and let
E_i = I1j#i Ej. We write O"ik = ui(Bik)· The projection of u E E onto :E_i will typically
be denoted by u _i. We will often write Si in place of the corresponding unit vector in Ei, 
sin place of the corresponding element in E, and so forth.
Let U be the set of multilinear (that is, linear in each agent's strategy) functions u : 
E -+ IR, and U = U 1. The specification of an element u = ( u1, • • •  , Un) E U is equivalent
to the customary description of a payoff function for an n person normal form game, since 
Ui is determined by the vector ( Ui ( s)) sES via the formula 
Ui(u) =I: (IJ O"j(Sj)) Ui( s).
BES jEI 
We will only be concerned with totally mixed equilibria. The following is an algebraic 
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expression of the condition that u E E is a totally mixed Nash equilibrium: 
(a1) 0 = ui(Bik, u-i) - ui(sw,u-i)i 
(b1) 0 < '7iki 
di 
(c1) 1 = L Uik· 
k=O 
(In this system, and in similar systems below, all equations are understood to hold for all 
values of the variables, i.e., for all i E I and 0 � k � di in (a1) and (b1), and all i E I in 
(c1).) 
We now recast ( a1) in a way that reduces the number of parameters by taking advantage 
of the fact that the equilibrium conditions depend only on the differences between the 
expected payoffs of the various pure strategies. Let Y = TiieI [Rdi. Conditions (b1) and
(c1) describes a Lief di dimensional manifold, which we call a. Let Vi� Ube the set of
all multilinear maps on E_i, and let V = fli Vidi. An element of V may be interpreted as
a map with domain a and range Y. Let proj : U -+  V be the linear surjection mapping 
a payoff u into a point v E V by the rule: 
Thus (a1) is equivalent to v (u) = O, where v = proj(u). 
We say that u, a totally mixed equilibrium for u, is regular if u is a regular point of 
v = proj(u). (That is, dvu : Tua -+ Tv(u)Y is surjective at u, where Tua and Tv(u)Y are 
the tangent spaces of a and Y at u and v (u) respectively.) Define U[k) to be the set of 
all u E U for which there are at least k regular totally mixed equilibria. It follows from 
the implicit function theorem that if u is a regular equilibrium for u, then nearby payoffs 
have nearby regular equilibria. So U[k) is an open set, for all k._ Let k* be the maximum k 
for which U[k] is not empty. (That such a k* exists is a consequence of Bezout's theorem, 
and also of its generalization by Kushnirenko and Bernstein, which we present in §3.) We 
want to characterize k*. 
Define V[k] to be the set of all v E V such that there are at least k regular points 
of v : a -+ Y which are solutions of the equation v ( u) = 0. It follows from the above 
discussion that V[k] = proj(U[k]) and U[k] = proj-1(V[k]). Since proj is an open map,
each V[k] is open, and the maximum k for which V[k] is non empty is equal to k*. Thus 
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our problem reduces to finding v EV for which there is the maximum number of regular
solutions, u E .6., of the system of equations v(u) = 0.
Now note that the components of such av are homogeneous polynomials. Therefore, 
the truth value of the condition v(u) = 0 is unaffected by replacing any ui with AiUi 
for any nonzero scalar Ai· From this point of view (c1) is a normalization specifying a 
particular representative of each n-dimensional space of solutions of (a1). But it will be 
more convenient in the analysis to use a different normalization, namely uw = 1, since in 
this way we eliminate one variable for each agent. 
For each i let Ti = { sn, .. . , Sid;} = Sj - { sw}. Define Ti to be the set of functions from
Ti into IR. Typical elements of Ti will be denoted by Ti· We write Tik = r( sik)· Define 
7=Tii7i. 
Define Wi to be the space of multi-affine maps w : 7--+ IR which are constant on Ti,. 
So Wi is the space of maps that are of degree 0 in each component of Ti and of degree 1 in 
each component of each Tj, for j-:/:- i. Then set w = ni wl;. Now let <I>: v--+ w be the
mapping which takes v into w via the rule 
wf(ri, . .. , Tn) = vf{(l, r1), . . . , (1, Tn))
Using the homogeneity of v, <I> defines a bijection between V and W: for any w E W,
v = <1> -1( w) is defined by vf(u) = (fliuiO)wf(</>(u)), where ¢(u) = (¢1(u1), ... ,¢n(un))
is defined by </>ik(ui) = � for 1 � i �di . 
Write 7+ = { r E 7 : Tik > 0 for all i, k }. Then restricting </> to domain .6., we have
that ¢ : .6. --+ 7+ is a bijection. We can write, w( r) = (fl uiO(r))-1v(</>-1(r)). But
then w(r) = 0 if.and only if v (¢-1 (r)) = 0. But for any r with v(¢-1(r)) = 0, d w., =
(Tii uw( r) )-1dv <fi-1 {r) o d¢;:1. Since d¢;:1 is of full rank, it follows that r is a regular point
of w if and only if ¢-1 ( r) is a regular point of v.
We say that r E 7 is a solution of w if w( r) = 0. A solution 7 of w is regular if it is a
regular value of w : 7 --+  Y. Define W[k] to be the set of all w E W such that there are 
at least k regular solutions of w. 
Therefore, our problem is equivalent to finding w E W for which there is the maximum
number of regular solutions, r E 7+, of the system
(a2) 0 = w( r) ;
(b2) 0 < Tik· 
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Now for any fixed To E 7 we can define a bijection from W into itself by the rule
w To ( T) = w ( T + To). Clearly T is a regular solution of w if and only if T - To is a regular
solution of w To. Thus any regular solution T of w for which T > To corresponds to a regular
solution T - To of wTo for which T - To> 0.
For any finite set of regular solutions of (a2), say { T1, • • •  , Tk}, it is possible to find To 
such that (b2) is satisfied by each Tj - To. The consequence of this is that if the set of 
w E W having a certain number of regular solutions of (a2) has a nonempty interior, then
so does the set of w having that number of regular solutions of (a2), and (b2). Hence,
condition (b2) can be dropped. Summarizing, 
Lemma 2.1: For any k, U[k] is nonempty if and only ifW[k] is nonempty.
For any w E W, as long as the set of regular solutions, { T1, • • •  , Tk}, of w can be
computed, the proof of lemma 2.1 provides a means of constructing a corresponding normal 
form game u E U with k regular Nash equilibria: Find To E 7 such that Tj > To for all
k. Then any u E proj-1 o <P-1(wT0) will have k regular solutions at {o.l, . .. , O'k}, where
qJ = ¢-1 (Tj -T0). Section 4 provides a method to find a w E W[k*] for which the Tj can
be computed. Together with the above argument, this gives a constructive method to find 
a normal form game with the maximum number of regular Nash equilibria. 
Bernstein's (1975) theorem, which we apply in §3, considers solutions in which no vari­
able vanishes. Thus we take our goal to be the characterization of the maximal number of 
regular solutions of the system 
3 
(a3) 0 = w(T); 
(b3) 0 =/= Tik•
The Number of Complex Nash Equlibria 
Since it contains no inequalities, the system ( *) makes sense over the field of complex
numbers, and in this section we study it in that context. For each i E I ,  let ii be the
space of functions 7: Ti-+ CC. Let T = IlieI ii, and T- i = Ilj:;i:i 7,. Let Wi be the space
of multiaffine maps w : t -+ cc which are constant on ii, and let w = nieI widi For each
i let 'Ji* = { Ti E ii : Ti (si) =/= 0 for all Si E Ti }. A complex equilibrium for w E W is a
7 E T satisfying ( *) . As in the real case, a complex equilibrium 7 for a payoff w is regular
if dw(7) E L(T, ccdi + ... + dn) is surjective.
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For all i E I and k = 1, ... , di, the exponent vectors a E TI7=1 '!ZJT; such that ro: =
TI7=1 Tij�1 Tijo:;j has a (potentially) nonzero coefficient in wf are precisely the elements of
n 
Aik = oi x IT Bj � IT '!ZJri,
j=f:.i i=l 
where Oi E '!ZJT; is the vector of O's, and Bj is the set containing the origin and the standard
unit basis vectors in IR T1. 
Define Qik = co(Aik) � TI�=1 IRT;. Then Qik is the Newton polytope of wf . 
d; 
Lemma 3.1: For for any A= {Aik E IR+ : i EI, k = 1, .. . , d i} define Q>. = 2: 2: AikQik· iE/ k=l 
For i, j = 1, ... , n and k = 1, ... , di let A{k be 0 if j = i and Aik if j '# i. For j E I let
�n �d · d 'h A-j = wi=l L.,,,k�l /\ik ' T en
Q>. =IT A_jco(Bj)· 
jEI 
Proof: Using the general fact that, for sets Ei, E2 C IR k and Fi, F2 c IR e,
we have 
n d; n d; n d; n 
Q>. = LLAikQik = LLAik · co(Oi x IT Bj) = co(LL IT A{kBj) i=l k=l i=l k=l j=f:.i i=l k=l j=l 
n n d; n 
= co(IT (LL A{k)Bj) = co(IT A-iBj)· • j=l i=l k=l j=l 
Let Vm(A) denote them-dimensional volume of A� !Rm. Note that the drdimensional
volume of co( B j) is d� 1 • Let d = di + ... + dn. It now follows immediately that
Corollary 3.2 : 
Bezout's theorem characterizes the generic (in the space of coefficients) number of roots, 
in complex cl-dimensional projective space, of a system of d homogeneous polynomials. The 
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papers of Kushnirenko (1975) and Bernstein (1975) give a combinatoric characterization of 
the generic number of complex roots of "sparse" systems of polynomials, where sparseness 
means that some of the coefficients are required to vanish, so that in effect one is consid­
ering a coordinate subspace of the space of coefficients considered by Bezout's theorem. 
Specifically, Bernstein's theorem states that the generic number of complex solutions of the 
system(*) is equal to the mixed volume, M( Q1, .. . , Qn) of the sets Qi, which is defined as 
the coefficient of >.11 · ... ·Aldi • . • . · An1 • • • •  · Aldn in the expansion of ( **) as a polynomial
in the variables Aik· Let \JI be the set of partitions P = {Pi, . . . , Pn} of Ti U ... U Tn such
that, for each i, #Pi = di and Pi n Ti = 0. By expanding (**) it is easy to obtain
Theorem 3.3: M(Qi, .. . , Qn) is the number of elements of\ll.
4 A Real System with the Generic Number of Regular Solutions
In this section we consider the special case of system ( *) in which, for each i and 
k = 1, ... 'di, 
wf(r-i) = IT af1(r1), 
ji=i 
where the af1 : E1 --+ IR  are nonzero affine functionals. For each j = 1, ... , n, let
Lj = { af1 : i # j, k = 1, ... , di}. 
(5.1) 
Theorem 4.1: If the functionals af1 are in general position in the sense that, for any
j and any subset L c L1 of cardinality q :s; dj, the affine subspace of I;; on which all
elements of L vanish has dimension dj - q, then the system(*) has #('11) solutions, each
of which is regular. 
Proof: At a solution T, for each j at most dj elements of L1 vanish. Since there are 
,Ei di functions wf, in order for each to vanish, for each j exactly d1 elements of L1 must
vanish at Tj, and for each i and k there must be exactly one j # i such that af1 vanishes.
Thus each solution T induces a partition of { wf : i = 1, ... , n, k = 1, ... , di } into sets 
U1, ... , Un where wf E U1 if at(r1) = 0. Note that #(U1) = d1 for each j and vf E U1 
implies that j # i. Conversely, given a partition with these properties, there is exactly one 
corresponding solution. 
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By varying Tj in the intersection of the kernels of the other af,� E Lj with af,� ( Tj) = 0,
one can change the value of wf (since no other afj' vanishes at r) without affecting any
other wf,'. Thus the image of the derivative of w includes each standard basis vector of
IR d1 + ... +dn, whence r is a regular solution. • 
5 The Function Cn 
In this section we study the asymptotic order of magnitude of #('I!), beginning with 
the following inductive characterization� 
Proposition 5.1: For each n = 1, 2, ... , and each pair c = (ci, . .. , en), d =( di, ... , dn) 
of vectors of nonnegative integers with ci + ... + Cn =di+ ... + dn, let Cn(c,d) be the
number of partitions P = {Pi, ... Pn} of Ti U ... U Tn with #(Pi) = Ci and Ti n Pi = 0, 
where Ti, .. . , Tn is a collection of pairwise disjoint sets in which # (Ti) = di. Then
Cn : { ( c, d) E zn x zn : L Ci = L di} -+ Z+ 
i i 
if the unique function satisfying the following conditions: 
(a) Cn(O, 0) = 1;
(b) Cn(c, d) = 0 whenever (c, d) � Nn x Nn;
( c) for each i = 1, ... , n, if di > 0 then
Cn(c,d) = LCn(c- ej,d- ei)· 
j-::j:.i 
where ei E IR n is the unit basis vector (that is, eij = 1 if i = j, and eij = 0 otherwise.)
Proof: In view of (c), induction on ci + ... + Cn =di+ ... + dn implies that there is at 
most one function satisfying (a) - ( c). That Cn satisfies these conditions also follows from 
induction on c1 + ... + Cn =di+ ... + dn. Specifically, fixing i with di > 0 and v E Ti, for 
each j i= i with Cj > 0 there is a one-to-one correspondence between partitions {Pi, ... Pn} 
as above with v E Pj and partitions {Wi, ... , Wn} of Ti U . .. U Ti - { v} U ... U Tn with
#(Wk)= Ck fork i= j, #(Wj) = Cj - 1, and Tin wi = 0. • 
Remark 5.2 : In fact the analysis in §3-4 extends easily to the generalization of system (*) 
in which the number di of equilibrium conditions for agent i may differ from the number
Ci of strategic degrees of freedom possessed by agent i. 
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The following properties of .C are easily verified. They are, respectively, the expressions 
of the strategic principles that the presence or absence of a dummy (a player with one 
pure strategy and consequently no strategic freedom) and the numbering of the players 
are inconsequential. 
Property 1: .Cn+1((c,O), (d,O)) = .Cn(c,d). 
Property 2: .Cn is unaffected by the interchange of any ( Ci, di) and ( cj, dj)· 
For the analysis of the complexity of various algorithms associated with the Nash equi­
librium concept one wishes to know tht:l asymptotic order of magnitude of the number of 
equilibria. On the one hand we may apply ( c) inductively to obtain 
.Cn(c,d) � (n-l)d1+ ... +dn-2.
(In fact this will coincide with the bound on the generic number of solutions resulting from 
Bezout's theorem.) The following lower bound is crude, in the sense that refinements seem 
possible, but it does provide the most basic information. 
Theorem 5.3 : .Jf c1 � c2 � • • •  � en, then
Proof: We say that (c, d) is tight at i if di= 'l:j;t:i Cj· Note that, since 'l:i Ci= 'l:i di, if
(c, d) is tight at both i and j, then ck= 0 fork =/= i, j, and in fact dk = 0 fork =/= i, j as 
well. Condition (c) of Proposition 5.1 then yields 
and by induction this quantity is precisely 1. 
Let j be the first integer such that Cj > 0. If there is no index at which ( c, d) is tight, 
let k be any index such that dk > 0. Otherwise let k be the index at which ( c, d) is tight. 
If, in the latter case, dk = 0, then j = k = n, and .Cn ( c, d) = 1, which is in conformity 
with the claim. Thus we may assume that dk > 0. 
To begin with we consider the case k � j. The induction formula yields 
.Cn(c, d) = L .Cn(c -ei, d - ek)· 
i2:;j i;Ck
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By induction we may assume that the claim holds for all n-tuples "smaller" (in the obvious
partial order) than ( c, d). Thus
.Cn(c, d) 2: L (n - it; · .. . · (n - i)c;-l · ... .  2cn-2
i�j i""k 
which is, of course, the desired inequality. 
It remains only to consider the possibility that k < j, but in this case the condition
i # k is no longer imposed in the summation alone, with the consequence that the resulting
lower bound is multiplied by n-i-J:-1• • 
· n-3 
Define A(n, k + 1) = .Cn(k, k), where k E IRn is the vector of k's; this is the maximal
generic number of equilibria for an n-person game in which each player has k + 1 pure
strategies. It is this function whose values are displayed in Figure 1.1. Also, define A1 = 0, 
and for n > 1, An= A(n, 2).
Proposition 5.4: A2 = 1, and for all n > 2, 
An = (n - l)(An-1 + An-2). 
Proof: That A2 = 1 follows directly from Proposition 5.1. Define L(j,k,l) = .Cn(c,d) 
where, for each i, Ci, di E {O, 1 }, and
J = #{i: (ci, di)= (1, 1)}
k = #{i: (ci, di)= (1, O)}. 
l = #{i: (ci, di) = (0, 1)}
Proposition 5.1 implies that 
and 
L(j, 1, 1) = L(j, 0, 0) + jL(j - 1, 1, 1)
Ai = L(j, 0, 0) = (j - l)L(j - 2, 1, 1)
= (j - l)L(j - 2, O, 0) + (j - l)(j - 2)L(j - 3, 1, 1) 
= (j - l)L(j - 2, 0, 0) + (j - l)L(j - 1, 0, 0 ) 
= (j - l)[Aj-2 + Aj-1]. • 
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Evidently An is the number of permutations of the integers from one to n without a
fixed point; such permutations are called derangements. Induction shows that it has the 
closed form* n -ljA = n" '°' ­n . � ·r . 0 J. J= 
and by comparing the right hand side with the power series expansion of the exponential 
function, evaluated at -1, one can show that 
6 A Three Person Example
lim (An)= e-1.n-+oo n! 
In this section we explore the algebra of the simplest case in which there can be multiple 
totally mixed equilibria, namely three players, each of whom has two pure strategies. As 
we will see, already the calculations are rather complicated. 
Let Si = {0, 1}, i = 1, 2, 3. Write v�e :-- vl(h,i) = ui(l,(h,i))-ui(O,(h;i)), for
i = 1, 2, 3, h, f E {O, 1}. Then equations (al) for an equilibrium become
vf 1 u21 u31 + vf0u21 U30 + vJ1 u2ou31 + vJ0u2ou30 = 0
vi 1 u11 u31 + viou11 u30 + v51 u10u31 + v5ou1ou30 = 0
vr1 l111 U21 + vrol1H l120 + v31 l110U21 + v3ol11Ql120 = 0.
For any interior solution, this system reduces to (a2): 
wi1 T2T3 + wi0T2 + wJ1 T3 + wJ0 = 0
wi1 Tl T3 + wi0T1 + w51 T3 + w50 = 0
wr1 Tl T2 + wroT1 + w31 T2 + wgo = 0.
where we define Ti= Ti!= � and w�e = wl(h,f), i = 1, 2, 3, h,f E {0, 1}, where w{ is
the function defined in §2. Then equations ( *) for an equilibrium become 
This system is equivalent to 
(T2 -a12) (T3 - a13) = <51 
(T1 - a21) (T3 - a23) = <52 
* We are grateful to Michel leBreton for this and the following observations.
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where 
0 
- I w?o w?1 I i i i i 8· - W10 Wu - Wo1W10 - WooWui ( wfi)2 ( wf 1)2 
�) 
w2 � '11 
0 
(i = l,2,3). 
It is tedious but straightforward to verify that there are two solutions, T = (Ti, T2, Ta) 
and T' = ( T{, T�, T�), to this system of equations, given by
where 
Ti =
----
2ci 
(In the definitions of T/i and di the indices are to be interpreted as integers modulo 3.) 
The solutions x1 and x2 are distinct if and only if� =/= 0. They are real if and only if
� 2: O; this will certainly be the case if any one of the three equations factor, in the sense 
that 8i = 0, in which case 81828a = 0. One can work out the conditions under which the
components of the roots are positive, but they are difficult to state and interpret. 
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